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I am delighted to be here with you today, toparticipate in the launching of the Arabic edition
of the World Bank Study organized by Professor Aoki of Stanford University and myself on the
Japanese Main Bank System.
The Japanese main bank system is one of very intensive relationships between a large
commercial bank – the main bank – and its large industrial and commercial borrowers.  It involves
close monitoring by the bank of the cmpany, gathering detailed information not otherwise available
on company plans and performance.  In return for this intrusive activity by the bank, if the company
falls into financial distress the main bank has a special responsib lity to rescue and restructure it if that
makes economic sense..  This system developed in the early period of great difficulty and uncertainty
following World War II, and developed and flourished up until the mid-1970s, the era of
exceptionally rapid economic growth, high rates of investment, and huge needs for business fixed
investment.
Part I of the English version of the study has 10 chapters which go into considerable detail
on the Japanese main bank system... they are definitive, and probably tell you more than you want to
know.  Part II is comparative in its focus.  I have written a chapter which pl ces the main bank system
in the broader context of the development of the Japanese financial system, and addresses how Japan
has dealt with generic issues that are relev nt for all developing and transforming economies moving
to a more market-oriented financial system.  My talk toda is based on, but somewhat different from,
that Chapter.
In the English edition, there are then six chapters written by specialists of other countries as
to what they find relevant from the Japanese main bank experience.  For each country the answer is
somewhat different of course.  First there is a chapter on Germany, the other major case of a banking-
based financial system, in contrast to the capital-market oriented systems of the U.K. and the U.S.
The remaining chapters are on Korea, India, Mexico, China, and Poland.
Introduction
Let me begin with some basic points about Japan, simply to remind you.
First, Japan is the world’s second largest economy – larger than France and Germany
combined, with an advanced, high tech industrial structure, relatively equal income distribution but
with wider productivity differentials by sector than any other advanced country.  Manufacturers,
especially for exports, are very efficient; services much less so; and agriculture economically very
inefficient and high cost.
Second,  Japan is the first non-Western, non-Christian, non-Caucasian country to achieve such
a successfully high level of development.
Culture is by far too vague a term to use as explanation, at least as used by
economists.  Nonetheless, most Japanese are
– hard-working
– well educated
– ambitious and competitive
– practical and pragmatic rather than ideological
– and materialistic – they are big consumers as well as savers
Third, Japan differs from the other East Asian success stories of rapid development in two
major ways –
1.  Industrialization started far earlier
– by WW II Japan was a significant industrial power
– by the end of the war, Japan had a European-level labor force in terms of
education and skills but a per capita income below Malaysia at the time, or
perhaps Morocco today – due to wartime devastation of its physical capital
and a widened technological gap
2.  The Japanese population is far larger than that of South Korea or Taiwan, or
any Southeast Asian economy except Indonesia.
– a large population with a rapidly growing economy means a huge
domestic market
– so while Japan has always been export oriented, it has been less so than
other Asian economies, and has a far more broadly based industrial structure
– nonetheless, in order to reconstruct the economy following World War
II, the national slogan was “Export and Save”
Export not simply to provide aggrg te demand but to earn foreign exchange
to pay for imports of machinery; raw materials – ranging from cotton to iron
ore; energy – Japan has no oil; and, increasingly, basic foodstuffs despite its
continuing protection of rice and selected other agricultural products.
And save – to provide the means for productive investment, the building of
new factories embodying new, imported technologies, and the infrastructure
essential for an industrial economy.
My purpose here is to explain how Japan has dealt with the basic problems and issues all
economies must face
– how to transfer savings efficiently and effectively to investors
– how to alleviate credit efficiently
– how to maintain financial system safety and also achieve efficiency in credit
allocation and financial intermediation
Basically, the Japanese approach has been to rely predominantly upon private ownership of
banks and other financial institutions, and upon the operation of financial markets – but with a rather
high degree of government regulation and intervention.
And, until recently Japan has developed a banking-based financial system – somewhat like
Germany, though there are many differences.  This is in distinction from the Anglo-American model
of finance, which emphasizes capital markets – stock and bond markets – though in practice banks
are very important, too.  My focus here will be on Japanese banking, not on the more recent
developments in the stock and bond markets.
Development of the Japanese Banking System
Modern Japanese banking can be divided into 4 historical stages.
The first is from the 1870s, when modern banks were first created based on Western models,
until the Banking Crisis of 1927, in which a number of banks failed.  During this period banking
developed very rapidly.  Entry was very easy, with only modest capital requirements and limited
supervision.  Many small local banks were established all over Japan; by the early 1900s there were
more than 2300 banks, only a few of which were of substantial size.
The positive aspects were that financial markets were free and comp titive; ordinary Japanese
developed the banking habit, as they earned competitive interest on savings deposits; and local and
regional financial markets were integrated into a national fin cial system.  The weaknesses were that
the smaller, local banks were prone to difficulty and collapse – because of local economic distress of
their industrial borrowers, or because the bank owners lent disproportionately to their own business
activities.  This risk was insufficiently diversified – by borrower and by region.
One consequence was a series of individual bank f ilures leading to bank runs and occasional
financial panics.  1927 was the occasion of a major banking crisis as several large and many smaller
banks failed and depositors lost their money.  Deposits quickly flowed to the large bank:  Mitsubishi,
Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda and others – and to the postal savings system.
The monetary authorities – the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan – were deeply
seared by this expense, and ever since they have placed a high premium on financial system safety,
even to the extent of preventing the bankruptcy of individual banks until very recently.
Thus, 1927 ushered in the second stage, running to 1945.  It was a period both of bank
consolidation and, with the advent of World War II, increasing direct control over the allocations of
credit.  It was not so different from planned economy systems of resource allocation.
In the 1930s, the monetary authorities reduced the number of banks to about 300, and as war
developed they decreased it even further – to a small number of  more-or-less nationwide banks with
branches, called the city banks, and then a small number – in principle one in each prefecture, in
practice about 60 local or regional banks.  During World War II the financial system, like all other
parts of the economy, were brought under government control in order to allocate resources to
military production.  Interest rates were fixed, saving was compulsory, goods were rationed, banks
were told what companies to lend to, and how much.
The loss of World War II resulted in bombed out cities and factories, demoralization, huge
inflation rates (at least by Japanese historical standards – by the time of the 1949 price stabilization
the price level was 300 times the prewar level, an Allied, predominantly American, occupation, and
a financial system in shambles.  The government was forced to repudiate loan guarantees to munitions
industries by banks and inflation wiped out the value both of deposits and government debt.
The third stage in the development of Japan’s banking system is the period from postwar
reconstruction to super-fast growth in the 1950s, 1960s, and until the oil crisis of 1973-74.  This is
the phase most directly relevant to developing and transforming economies.
During this period the contemporary financial system was firmly established, especia ly the
banking system and the rise of th main bank system.  Like everything else the banking system grew
very rapidly.  Deposits poured in, and the business demand for funds to investment were even greater.
It was a highly regulated system, market-based, but one in which the rules of the game were that all
banks would grow at more or less the same rate – the convoy system – and, when necessary, the
stronger banks would help out the weaker.
It is this stage that probably is of greatest relevance to economies moving from high degrees
of state planning and government intervention to a more market-based financial system.
However, before turning to that historical period in more detail, let me note the fourth stag
of Japanese financial development, from the mid-1970s until the present, and indeed until the year
2000 when the Japanese so-called Big Bang of financial deregulation is supposed to be completed.
This is the era of deregulation: the ending of controls over interest rates, allowing banks and
other financial institutions to enter each other’s segmented markets, and to create – although
somewhat slowly – new financial instruments.  Equally important, it has been a period in which the
capital market has thrived, especially the corporate bond market which has attracted the major
industrial companies away from their traditional reliance on loans from large banks.
It has also been an era of three major mistakes, two by the monetary authorities and by the
participants in financial markets.
The first mistake of the monetary authorities was to deregulate the banking system, and the
financial system more generally, without instituting at the same time an effective system of prudential
regulation and supervision.
– While BIS capital adequacy requirements applied to larger banks doing international
business, they did not apply to smaller banks or credit associations
– supervision was poor, especially of smaller banks and institutions
– the previously opaque system of lack of disclosure and transp rency was allowed to persist,
so it has been difficult to know the actual condition of banks in trouble
– while a deposit insurance scheme was finally introduced in the 1970s, and increased to 10
million yen (roughly $80,000 U.S. dollars), in practice depositors have assumed that al
deposits are guaranteed by the government, and indeed the Ministry of Finance in 1995 made
explicit such a guarantee, to end only by the year 2000.
The second mistake of the monetary authorities was to pursue a very easy, low interest rate
monetary policy in the late 1980s, precipitating a major asset price boon even while goods and
services prices – the inflation rate – was very low and stable.  The result was the creation of stock
market and especially urban real estate bubbles in the late 1980s.
The mistake of participants in financial markets – bankers, borrowers, real estate developers,
households, the monetary authorities – was to believe that the price of land and real estate woul
never go down very far or for a sustained period of time.  After all, it had been the safest form of
collateral ever since World War II – easy to sell if a loan was defaulted and without a loss.  This
collective myopia led to the real estate speculative boom of the late 1980s, fueled by loans from
banks, their non-bank financial institution subsidiaries and affiliates, and others.  The rise in urban land
prices intertwined with a doubling, then tripling, of stock prices in the stock market.
That is, until 1990, when the twin stock and land bubbles rst.  Stock prices declined by
more than 60%, and now, 7 years later, are still 45% below their previous peak.  More seriously,
urban commercial real estate prices have fallen by about two-thirds, and perhaps only now are
reaching their bottom.  They are the primary source of the huge bad loan problem afflicting both large
and small Japanese banks.
But that is another story.  It nonetheless provides two cautionary lessons:
1– When regulators deregulate and liberalize, they should simultaneously impose
effective prudential regulatory and supervisory measures.
2– When greed dominates – when the willingness to take risk increases and the
objective reward prospects decrease – all should beware.
Banking in Japan’s Postwar High Growth Era
Let me return to Japan’s third phase:  the two decades of postwar financial development that
successfully intermediated between burgeoning new saving and huge investment opportunities and
activities in what was a period of great uncertainty and limited information.  In the 1950s particularly,
when Japan was classified as a less developed country and its future growth prospects seemed
uncertain, how Japan handled some of the gneric problems to achieve efficient and effective finance
is of particular relevance for other developing and transforming economies, including those in the
MENA countries and the Middle East.
Most importantly, by the early 1950s Japan had achieved macroeconomic stability.  Inflation
had been halted, the government was required to run a balanced budget so there was no deficit
spending (or government bond issue), and monetary policy – the cost and especially the availability
of credit – was the main macroeconomic policy instrument.  The exchange rate was fixed at a rate
which made exports of, first, labor-intensive products and then more sophisticated products,
competitive –from textiles to ships to steel.
Private markets and private ownership predominated.  The government owned the national
railroad system and the telephone system, but not much else.  Inefficient state enterprise was not the
albatross around the neck of government that it is elsewhere.  There was an adequate institutional
infrastructure to support domestic markets – a legal system, enforceable contracts, and property
rights – through often disputes were and are resolved through negotiated compromise rather than
going to lawyers.  Japan is not a litigious society.
There were many newinvestment opportunities, due to the lag in Japanese technology from
American and European levels – plus large numbers of entrepreneurs, managers, engineers, and
skilled workers geared to increasing production, improving productivity, and developing new
products – in competition with other firms for the domestic market.  And entry was easy.  Good
examples are consumer electronics, and the 9Japanese automobile producers.  Profits remained high
even as investment rose dramatically as a share of GDP.  This meant that the demand for funds to
finance investment was strong.  Huge amounts of technology was obtained, mainly by technology
licenses and overseas education.  As the economy grew, the savings rate increased dramatically.  The
household saving rate went from 5% of household income to 10%-15% – peaking at 24% in the mid-
1970s.  Corporations saved as much as they could, too, paying out low dividend rates.  And the
government was a net saver, financing its infrastructure projects out of tax revenues.
The government decided early on to use the banking system as the mechanism to transfer
savings to business investors.  It restrained the development of the stock and bond markets.  Its
rationale was that
– stocks were too risky for ordinary savers, and hence demand would be low
– the bad experience with postwar inflation and the loss of government bond values meant
that individuals also thought bonds were too risky
– on the other hand, savings deposits in banks would be the safe way to attract the funds of
savers.  And they were right.
The banking system was designed to specialize, by size of customer and by term and type of
loan.  Thus, segmentation among the various categories of banks was the mode of operation.
The core of the banking system was the 20+ big banks – 
– the 13, now 10, city banks operating throughout the country
– the 7 trust banks, accepting longer term deposits and specializing more in
commercial real estate finance
– the three long term credit banks, financing the building of factories and purchase
of equipment, being funded by issuing their own one-year and 5-year bonds.
These big banks were expected to finance the needs of large industrial firms, based on their
creditworthiness and growth prospects.  Th  60 or so local and regional banks were to finance small
and medium-sized enterprises in their area.  Below this existed a whole panoply of deposit-taking
institutions: mutual savings and loan banks, credit associations, credit ooperativ s, agricultural credit
cooperatives.  Their purpose was to accept deposits from and make loans to small businesses and
farmers.  There were a large number of them, but most were quite small – and some very poorly
managed.
In retrospect, these small institutions constitute a great vulnerability in today’s deregulated
system.
– On the one hand, as deposit-taking institutions, they are susceptible to bank runs if
depositors lose confidence in them, which could quickly become panics of systemi
proportions.
– On the other hand, most are under the regulatory supervision of their e pective prefectures,
and that supervision is particularly weak and inadequate.
– Moreover, there is little disclosure.  While we know now the dimensions, more or less, of
the bad loan problems for larger banks, we have very little information about the actual
condition of these small institutions – until they collapse!
While the private banking system dominated in terms of total loans, several government
institutions were also important, especially the Japan Export-Import Bank which promoted exports
of ships and machinery with long-term loans, and the Japan Development Bank, which made loans
to key strategic industries, typically in syndication with the private long-term credit banks and the
major city banks.
In terms of international cmparison with the experience of other countries the government-
owned Japan Development Bank is virtually uniquely successful.  First, it always makes a profit, not
losses.
– It has to charge a positive real interest ra  since its funds come from postal savings, and
those depositors have to be paid.
– This, its credit subsidy was perhaps 2-3% age points below the market rate, always positive
in real terms.
– Moreover, while it extended the longest term por ion of a syndicated loan, it had first claim
on the collateral in the event of a loan default.
Second, Japan Development Bank loans were made essentially by market principles of
banking creditworthiness and project feasibility, with virtually no interference by politicians or
government bureaucrats.  There was virtually no corruption in its lending process.  The government
decided which industries, rather broadly, but the Japan Development Bank loan officers chose the
company and project.
Financial intermediation – by bank and by other financial institutions – inherently involves
risks since the commitments made are inter-temporal.  There are many kinds of risk, including
– credit risk as borrowers cannot repay
– inflation risk which erodes the real value of financial assets
– interest rate risk from mismatching of assets and liabilities
– foreign exchange risk
Banks and other financial institutions reduce risk by pooling and diversification of portfolios.
From the viewpoint of the monetary authorities, and indeed from everyone, the two major
criteria for a successful financial system are safety and efficiency.  There are several dimensions to
safety.
– the fundamental one is the protection of depositors to offer hem a very safe and convenient
financial asset
– safety of the system, systemic safety, requires mechanisms to prevent a single bank
bankruptcy or a run on a bank from becoming a financial panic, with widespread deposit
withdrawals
– similarly, systemic safety requires mechanisms to protect the payments system and the
settlement system
Given its prewar experience, the Japanese government attached extremely high priority to the
safety not just of deposits, but of banks.  A regulated system was established so that no banks were
allowed to fail, while competition was constrained, first of all by nterest rate policy.
– ceiling interest rates on deposit were established, at quite low rates in real terms
– ceiling interest rates were also set on loans, though some evasion was tolerated, and
demand was high
– the spread was sufficiently wide that even the most marginal bank made profits
Second, entry conditions were severe
– no new banks were allowed to be established
– creation of new branch offices was limited, and licenses allocated carefully, since branches
collected eposits and deposits were profitable.  All banks were supposed to grow at
about the same speed
Third, if a bank – typically a small one – was so poorly managed that it got into trouble, then
it was merged into a larger bank.  Even if it had losses, it nonetheless had the franchise value of its
branch offices since interest rates were low and demand for loans high.
From the saver’s perspective, this system wa  completely safe – and Japanese are risk-averse
– but the interest rate on deposits was inefficiently low and alternative financial instruments were not
available.  However, in the high growth era savers were willing to put up with this because they could
see their deposits becoming highly productive loans to business, and business spawned the rapid
growth which generated not only high profits but substantial increases in real wages.
It is on the lending side – the use of savings – that the efficiency story is so important.  While
of course there were mistakes, on the whole Japan’s banking system allocated funds to highly
productive business investment projects.  In retrospect that seems obvious – and the period of
sustained rapid growth meant mistakes were not serious.  But at the time – in the 1950s – the
investment environment was very uncertain.  Information on companies was limited, often of poor
quality, and there was great information asymmetry: banks initially knew far less about the company’s
actual conditions and intentions than did the company and its manager.  Moreover, companies were
building new plants based on foreign technologies which were being imported under license.  How
were projects to be evaluated, and accepted or rejected for financing?  Which technologies would
prevail?
Japan’s vaunted main bank system of very close relationships between large banks and their
large industrial clients is the way in which these problems we e overcome.  It evolved out of the need
to assess credit risk and to attract nd keep excellent customers.  It is a system of ongoing, repeated
loans and other financial business, a system of mutual interdependence of bank and customer, not
subjection of one to the other.
The main bank relationship is multidimensional.  Typically, the bank was
– the single largest lender to the company (15-25% of its borrowings), but not the sole lender
– the organizer of a de facto syndicate of other banks and lending institutions to the customer
– the main clearing bank for the customer, and provider of trustee, foreign exchange and
other services, at good fees
– it held close to 10% of the company’s shares (a maximum reduced to 5% in the 1980s), and
the company held some f the bank’s shares – not to exercise control but as a symbol of the
relationship
– the bank had special access to very detailed information about the company’s plans and
prospects, and monitored its performance, in effect providing management consulting
services
– the main bank had a special responsibility to help out its client in times of distress –
to refinance, to restructure it, even if costly to the main bank.  Usually this involved replacing
top management.
This system was efficient in two respects.  First, by investing staff and time into monitoring,
the main banks were able to increase information and improve credit evaluation, thereby reducing
loan risk premia; and probably this oversight provided incent v s for borrower company management
to perform well, and not to shirk.  Second, the main bank system reduced the costs of reorganizing
and restructuring firms in distress.  Of course, if they were beyond hope the company was closed.
Otherwise, management was changed, financing was restructured, new s rategic business alliances
found – all of this more quickly and more cheaply than in the highly legalistic U.S. system.
It should be said that the main bank system was very much a product of its times and the
needs they generated.  Main banks play a role today, but in much less pronounced a form, and for a
different set of clients – mid-sized companies preparing for an initial issue in the stock market have
found a main bank relationship very useful.
Several factors have reduced the intensity of the main bank relationship over the past two
decades.  First, with the ending of super-rapid growth in the mid-1970s, the financial system shifted
from one of financial tightness to ease, as the domestic saving rate became higher than the domestic
investment rate; accordingly interest rates declined and competition increased.  Second, deregulation
brought other competitors into the loan market.  Perhaps more importantly, the development of a
corporate bond market – especially the Euro-bond market – with lower borrowing costs, made it
possible for top quality companies to finance through bond issue.  Third, the very success of the
Japanese economy and its companies meant that the business environment was much more stable;
information was much better, more widely available, and transparent; and international credit rating
companies could and did rate J panese companies and their debt issues.  Fourth, companies, while
continuing to value a main bank relationship but always fearful of an unequal bargaining position,
substituted a system of 2 or 3 core banks for the single main bank.
Given a system of intense relationship banking, there are possibilities of its misuse – by the
stockholders, by the managers themselves, by the government.  On the whole, that did not happen
a great deal.  Except for some very small banks, the stockholders do not control the banks.  Stock
ownership is highly dispersed, is a system of cross-shareholding in which companies hold the majority
of shares in each other, in banks, and banks in them.  This was a mechanism developed by
management to entrench itself, to protect itself for the threat of hostile take-over.  All Japanese
companies behave this way. Accordingly, management stays in power under normal circumstances.
How then, does corporate governance work?
– for industrial corporations, n substantial part through its main bank, as well as an informal
council of retired chairmen
– for banks, management is subject to the broad regulatory authority of the government,
whose basic objectives are safety
– – and strong banks helping out weaker ones in a crisis
There is a symbiotic relationship between the bankers and the regulators; retired Ministry of
Finance and Bank of Japan officials become members of the senior management of banks.
Given the lack of information and the opaqueness of transactions, and some degree of credit
rationing, there has been remarkably little corruption in the Japanese banking system, compared to
many other countries.  My interpretation is not that Japanese are fundamentally more honest, but that
the penalties for being caught are huge.  Japanese place great emphasis on status and pride in a job
well done.  To be caught in a bribery situation means both great shame – on self, family, and
employing institution; and a loss of job in a managerial labor market in which there would be no other
opportunities. So while the financing of politics and politicians is dubious, most g vernment officials
– a true career elite – and bankers are not corrupt.
Finally, let me address two broader issues.
First, I have focused mainly on the financing of big business by the large banks, and their
reduction of costs through information gathering and monitoring.  But how were other sectors
financed: small business, infrastructure, exports?  The structure of small business finance was similar
to that for big business: small banks and specialized lending institutions, though requiring collateral
and lending at higher interest rates.  Infrastructure – the regional electric power companies, the
national railroad, the telephone company – were financed by bond issues and loans on preferential
terms: buyers were the large private financial institutions subscribing in proportion to their size.
Important also was government institution lending.  The central bank accepted these bonds as
collateral for low interest rate loans to city banks, in effect indirectly financing these infrastructure
projects through the normal (desired) growth in the money supply.
While infrastructure needs were great, and were met, the rest of the government sector was
kept small.  During the 1950s and 1960s, there was little in the way of social safety nets.  The
government did not provide jobs, nor did it provi e unemployment insurance.  The labor market was
flexible, and everyone worked.  And families took care of their family members.  The rapid growth
that ensued was a virtuous circle: creating new jobs, raising productivity, wages, incomes,  and
saving, and making attractive more new productive investment.
Export credit was readily available, and relatively cheap; export bills were rediscounted by
the central bank, and the Japan Export-Import Bank provided longer-term export credits.  Industries
generating exports had little difficulty in borrowing.
Second, I have alluded to relatively low interest rates and some degree of credit rationing.
Such policies of financial repression are also an avenue for corruption and for misallocation of
resources.  Why didn’t this become a serious problem in Japan?  The main reason is that financial
repression was very mild.  First, A market-clearing interest rate was quite high, perhaps 7-9% in real
terms, because of the high productivity of investment.
The credit subsidies provided by the Japan Development Bank and by interest rate ceilings
on loans, though they were often evaded in practice, were low – 2 to 3 percentage points below the
market rate.  So even subsidized credit was provided at a positive real interest rate.
Second, credit rationing was by broad categories, not narrow.  Banks could choose among
priority sectors, and did reject some the government targeted for support, such as ocean shipping.
There were no national champion companies which obtained preferential credit.  The state did not
own manufacturing enterprises.  Basically, the credit allocation system, in cost and availability,
discriminated against consumer credit, housing loans, and small business, and in favor of big business
in the period we are considering.
Two cliches have been Japan Inc. and MITI industrial policy.  Both are simplistic
misrepresentations of the market realities.  Two of Japan’s most successful industries, automobiles
and consumer electronics, were built by Japanese companies despite the government rather than
because of special targeting.
In simply summary, Japan’s banking system contributed so much in the postwar rapid growth
era because
– families saved a large share of their incomes, and put their savings into bank saving deposits
– banks lent to firms based on their credit-worthiness and growth potential
– firms had to borrow a great deal to finance their market growth opportunities, and loans
were the only external source of funds
– the main banks carefully monitored their client companies to ensure that management
performed well, and good projects were chosen
– and the regulatory authorities monitored the banks to ensure that they maintained their
safety and thereby the safety of the entire financial system.
